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Abstract
In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary
concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number
of methods to control this average delay have received substantial attention, including network tolls,
Stackelberg routing, and edge removal.
A related approach with arguably greater practical relevance is that of making investments in im-
provements to the edges of the network, so that, for a given investment budget, the average delay at
equilibrium in the improved network is minimized. This problem has received considerable attention
in the literature on transportation research and a number of different algorithms have been studied. To
our knowledge, none of this work gives guarantees on the output quality of any polynomial-time algo-
rithm. We study a model for this problem introduced in transportation research literature, and present
both hardness results and algorithms that obtain nearly optimal performance guarantees.
• We first show that a simple algorithm obtains good approximation guarantees for the problem.
Despite its simplicity, we show that for affine delays the approximation ratio of 4/3 obtained by
the algorithm cannot be improved.
• To obtain better results, we then consider restricted topologies. For graphs consisting of parallel
paths with affine delay functions we give an optimal algorithm. However, for graphs that consist
of a series of parallel links, we show the problem is weakly NP-hard.
• Finally, we consider the problem in series-parallel graphs, and give an FPTAS for this case.
Our work thus formalizes the intuition held by transportation researchers that the network improve-
ment problem is hard, and presents topology-dependent algorithms that have provably tight approxima-
tion guarantees.
1 Introduction
Routing games are widely used to model and analyze networks where traffic is routed by multiple users, who
typically pick their route to minimize their delay [26]. Routing games capture the uncoordinated nature of
traffic routing. A prominent concern in the study of these games is the overall social cost, which is usually
taken to be the average delay suffered by the players at equilibrium. It is well known that equilibria are
generally suboptimal in terms of social cost. The ratio of the average delay of the worst equilibrium routing
to the optimal routing that minimizes the average delay is called the price of anarchy; tight bounds on the
price of anarchy are well-studied and are known for various classes of delay functions [21, Chapter 18].
However, the notion of price of anarchy assumes a fixed network. In reality, of course, networks change,
and such changes may intentionally be implemented by the network designer to improve quality of service.
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This raises the question of how to identify cost-effective network improvements. Our work addresses this
fundamental design problem. Specifically, given a budget for improving the network, how should the de-
signer allocate the budget among edges of the network to minimize the average delay at equilibrium in the
resulting, improved network? This crucial question arises frequently in network planning and expansion,
and yet seems to have received no attention in the algorithmic game theory literature. This is surprising
considering the attention given to other methods of improving equilibria, e.g., edge tolls and Stackelberg
routing.
Our model of network improvement is adopted from a widely studied problem in transportation research
[34] called the Continuous Network Design Problem (CNDP) [1]. In this model, each edge in the network
has a delay function that gives the delay on the edge as a function of the traffic carried by the edge. Specifi-
cally, the delay function on each edge consists of a free-flow term (a constant), plus a congestion term that
is the ratio of the traffic on the edge to the conductance of the edge, raised to a fixed power. The cost to
the network designer of increasing the conductance of an edge by one unit is an edge-specific constant. Our
objective is to select an allocation of the improvement budget to the edges that minimizes the social cost of
equilibria in the improved network.
The continuous network design problem, along with the discrete network design problem that deals
with the creation (rather than improvement) of edges, has been referred to as “one of the most difficult
and challenging problems facing transport” [34]. The CNDP is generally formulated as a mathematical
program with the budget allocated to each edge and the traffic at equilibrium as variables. Since the traffic is
constrained to be at equilibrium, such a formulation is also called a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium
Constraints (MPEC). Further, since the traffic at equilibrium is itself obtained as a solution to a optimization
problem, this is also a bilevel optimization problems. Both bilevel optimization problems and MPECs have
a number of other applications and have been studied independent of the CNDP as well (e.g., [7]).
Owing both to the rich structure of the problem and its practical relevance, the CNDP has received
considerable attention in transportation research. Because of the nonconvexity and the complex nature of
the constraints, the bulk of the literature focuses on heuristics, and proposed algorithms are evaluated by
performance on test data rather than formal analysis. Many of these algorithms are surveyed in [34]. More
recent papers give algorithms that obtain global optima [18, 19, 32], but make no guarantees on the quality
of solutions that can be obtained in polynomial time.
In this paper, we consider a model with fixed demands, separable polynomial delay functions on the
edges and constant improvement costs. This particular model, and further restrictions of it, have been the
focus of considerable attention, e.g., [10, 13, 20], and is frequently used for test instances. The model cap-
tures many of the essential characteristics of the more general problems, such as the bilevel and nonconvex
nature of the problem and the equilibrium constraints. Our work thus gives the first algorithmic results with
proven output quality and runtime for the network improvement problem.
Our Contributions. We first focus on general graphs, and show that a simple algorithm that relaxes equi-
librium constraints on the flow gives an approximation guarantee that is tight for linear delays.
• We show that for general networks with multiple sources and sinks and polynomial delays, a simple
algorithm gives an O(d/ log d)-approximation to the optimal allocation, where d is the maximum
degree of the polynomial delay functions. If d = 1, this gives a 4/3-approximation algorithm.
• We show that the approximation ratio for linear delays is tight, even for the single-commodity case:
by a reduction similar to that used by Roughgarden [27], we show that it is NP-hard to obtain an
approximation ratio better than 4/3.
The hardness result crucially depends on the generality of the network topology. The practical relevance
of the network improvement problem then motivates us to consider restricted topologies of networks, for
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which we give both polynomial-time algorithms and further hardness results. We restrict ourselves to single
source and sink networks for the following results.
• In graphs consisting of parallel s-t paths with linear delays, we show that even though the problem
is non-convex, first-order conditions are sufficient for optimality. We utilize this property and the
special structure of the first-order conditions to give an optimal polynomial-time algorithm. If each
path consists of a single edge, we give a particularly simple optimal algorithm.
• In contrast to our previous hardness result, we show that even in graphs with linear delays and with
very simple topologies consisting of a series of parallel links, called series-dipole graphs, obtaining
the optimal allocation for a given investment budget is NP-hard.
• Lastly, in series-parallel networks with polynomial delays, we show that there exists a fully-polynomial
time approximation scheme. Our algorithm is based on discretizing simultaneously over the space
of flows and allocations and showing there is a near-optimal flow and allocation in the discretized
space which can be obtained efficiently for series-parallel networks. The discretized flow may not
correspond to the equilibrium flow; however, in series-parallel graphs, we show that the delay at
equilibrium is at most the delay of the discretized flow.
Our work thus presents a fairly comprehensive set of approximation guarantees for the problem of
network improvement. We give tight bounds on the approximability of the problem in general networks,
and optimal and near-optimal algorithms for restricted topologies. Further, we show that the problem is
NP-hard — though weakly so — even in very restricted topologies. Our results thus supplement the work
in transportation research on the problem, by formalizing the intuition that the problem is hard, and giving
tight approximation algorithms for a number of cases.
2 Related Work
Routing games as a model of traffic on roads were introduced by Wardrop in 1952 [33]. Beckmann et
al. [3] showed that equilibria in routing games are obtained as the solution to a strictly convex optimization
problem if all delay functions are increasing, thus establishing the existence and uniqueness of equilibria.
Wardrop’s model, and our work, focuses on nonatomic routing games where the traffic controlled by each
player is infinitesimal. This is a good assumption for road traffic since an individual driver has negligible
impact on the delay. However, many other models of traffic in routing games are studied as well. For
example, in atomic games, players can control significant traffic; this traffic may be splittable (e.g., [14, 5])
or unsplittable (e.g., [23]), depending on whether a player may split her traffic among multiple routes.
The problem of obtaining formal bounds on the efficiency of equilibria in games was first studied by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16]. The price of anarchy — the ratio of the social cost at the worst
equilibrium routing to the social cost of an optimal routing — was later introduced by Papadimitriou [22]
as a formal measure of inefficiency. For nonatomic routing games with the social cost given by the average
delay, the price of anarchy is known to be 4/3 for linear delays [28], and Θ(p/ log p) for delay functions that
are polynomials of degree p [24].
Significant research has gone into the use of tolls to improve the efficiency of routing games. It is
known that tolls corresponding to the marginal delay of an optimal flow induce the optimal flow as an
equilibrium [3]. More generally, tolls to induce any minimal routing can be obtained as the solution to a
linear program [8, 15, 35]. A similar result for atomic splittable routing games was shown independently by
Swamy [31] and Yang and Zhang [36]. These results compute efficiency without adding tolls to the delay
of the players, and hence disregard the effect of tolls on the utility of the players in this computation. If
tolls are added to the delays in the computation of efficiency, then even for linear delays, it is NP-hard to
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obtain tolls that give better than a 4/3-approximation [6]. Since a 4/3-approximation can be obtained by not
applying any tolls, this result says that it is NP-hard to find improving tolls.
Motivated by Braess’s paradox, where removal of an edge improves the efficiency of the equilibrium
routing, Roughgarden [27] studies the problem of removing edges from a network to minimize the delay at
equilibrium in the resulting network. The problem is strongly NP-hard, and there is no algorithm with an
approximation ratio better than n/2 for general delay functions. Another method studied for improving the
efficiency of routing is Stackelberg routing, which assumes that a fraction of the traffic is centrally controlled
and is routed to improve efficiency. Obtaining the optimal Stackelberg routing is NP-hard even in parallel
links [25], although a fully-polynomial time approximation scheme is known for this case [17].
The importance of the network improvement problem has caused it to receive significant attention in
transportation research, where the version we are considering is known as the continuous network design
problem’. Early research focused on heuristics that did not give any guarantees about the quality of the solu-
tion obtained. These were based on sensitivity analysis of the variational inequality to implement gradient-
descent [11], as well as derivative-free algorithms [1]. For a survey of other algorithms and early results on
the continuous network design problem, see [34].
More recent work in the transportation literature has also tried to obtain algorithms that obtain global
minima for the continuous network design problem. Early approaches include the use of simulated anneal-
ing [10] and genetic algorithms [38]. Li et al. [18] reduce the problem to a sequence of mathematical
programs with concave objectives and convex constraints, and show that the accumulation point of the se-
quence of solutions is a global optimum. If the sequence is terminated early, they show weak bounds on
the quality of the solution that are consequential only under strong assumptions on the delay function and
agents’ demands. Wang and Lo [32] reformulate the problem as a mixed integer linear program (MILP)
by replacing the equilibrium constraints by constraints containing binary variables for each path, and using
a number of linear segments to approximate the delay functions. This approach was further developed by
Luathep et al. [19] who replaced the possibly exponentially many path variables by edge variables and gave
a cutting constraint algorithm for the resulting MILP. The last two methods were shown to converge to a
global optimum of the linearized approximation in finite time, but require solving a MILP with a possibly
exponential number of variables and constraints.
A variant of the problem where the initial conductance of every edge in the network is zero, and the
budget is part of the objective rather than a hard constraint, is studied by Marcotte [20] and, independent
of our work, by Gairing et al. [12]. Unlike the work cited earlier, these papers give provable guarantees
on the performance of polynomial-time algorithms. Marcotte gives an algorithm that is a 2-approximation
for monomial delay functions and a 5/4-approximation for linear delay functions. Gairing et al. present an
algorithm that improves upon these upper bounds, give an optimal polynomial-time algorithm for single-
commodity instances, and show that the problem is APX-hard in general. In our problem, the budget is
a hard constraint, and edges may have arbitrary initial capacities. Our problem is demonstrably harder
than this variant: e.g., in contrast to the polynomial-time algorithm for single-commodity instances given
by Gairing et al. [12], we show that in our problem no approximation better than 4/3 is possible even in
single-commodity instances.
3 Notation and Preliminaries
G = (V,E) is a directed graph with |E| = m and |V | = n. If G is a two-terminal graph, then it has two
special vertices s and t called the source and the sink, collectively called the terminals. A u-v path p =
((v0, v1), (v1, v2), . . . , (vk−1, vk)) is a sequence of edges with v0 = u, vk = v and edges (vi, vi+1) ∈ E. In
a two-terminal graph, each edge lies on an s-t path, and we use P to denote the set of all s-t paths. Given
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vertices s′, t′ in graph G, vector (fe)e∈E is an s′-t′ flow of value d if the following conditions are satisfied:∑
(u,w)∈E
fuw −
∑
(w,u)∈E
fwu = 0, ∀u ∈ V \ {s′, t′}
∑
(s,w)∈E
fsw −
∑
(w,s)∈E
fws = d
fe ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E .
We use |f | to denote the value of flow f . A path decomposition of an s′-t′ flow f is a set of flows {fp}
along s′-t′ paths p that satisfies fe =
∑
p:e∈p fp, ∀e. A path decomposition for flow f so that fp > 0 for at
most m paths can be obtained in polynomial time [2]. Without reference to a path decomposition, we use
fp > 0 to indicate that fe > 0 for all e ∈ p.
Each edge e ∈ E has an increasing delay function le(x) that gives the delay on the edge as a function of
the flow on the edge. For flow f and path p, lp(f) :=
∑
e∈p le(fe) is the delay on path p. Further, fele(fe)
is the total delay on edge e, and the total delay of flow f is
∑
e∈E fele(fe).
Routing games. A routing game is a tuple Γ = (G, l,K) where G is a directed graph, l is a vector of delay
functions on edges, and K = {si, ti, di}i∈I is a set of triples where di is the total traffic routed by players
of commodity i from si to ti. Each player of commodity i in a routing game controls infinitesimal traffic
and picks an si-ti path p on which to route her flow, as her strategy. The strategies induce a flow f i. Let
f =
∑
i f
i
, then the delay of a player that selects path p as her strategy is lp(f). In the single-commodity
case, |I| = 1. We say a flow f is a valid flow for routing game Γ if f = ∑i∈I f i where each f i is an si-ti
flow of value di.
At equilibrium in a routing game, each player minimizes her delay, subject to the strategies of the other
players. The equilibrium in a routing game is also called a Wardrop equilibrium.
Definition 1. A set of flows {f i}i∈I where f i is an si-ti flow of value di is a Wardrop equilibrium if for all
i ∈ I , for any si-ti paths p, q such that f ip > 0, lp(f) ≤ lq(f).
We use equilibrium flow to refer to the set of flows {f i}i∈I that form a Wardrop equilibrium. The
equilibrium flow is also obtained as the solution to the following mathematical program. Since the delay
functions are increasing, the program has a strictly convex objective with linear constraints, and hence the
first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. Further, because of strict convexity, the
equilibrium flow is unique.
min
∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
le(x) dx, s.t. f =
∑
i∈I f
i and f i is an si-ti flow of value di .
Definition 1 then corresponds to the first-order conditions for optimality of the convex program. By
Definition 1, each si-ti path p with f ip > 0 has the same delay at equilibrium. Let Li be this common path
delay. Then the total delay
∑
e fele(fe) =
∑
i di L
i
, where f =
∑
i∈I f
i and {f i}i∈I is the equilibrium
flow. The average delay is
∑
i di L
i/
∑
i di.
Network Improvement. In the network improvement problem, we are given a routing game Γ, where the
delay function on each edge e is of the form le(x) = (x/ce)ne + be. We call ce the conductance, 1/ce the
resistance, and be the length of edge e. We assume ce ≥ 0 and ne > 0, and hence the delay is an increasing
function of the flow on the edge. The delay function on an edge is affine if ne = 1. Each edge has a marginal
cost of improvement, µe. Upon spending βe to improve edge e, the conductance of the edge increases to
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ce + µeβe. For a given budget B, a valid allocation is a vector β = (βe)e∈E so that
∑
e βe ≤ B and βe ≥ 0
for each e ∈ E. The objective is to determine a valid allocation of the budget B to the edges to minimize the
average delay obtained at equilibrium with the modified delay functions le(x, βe) = (x/(ce + µeβe))ne+be.
Delay functions are affine if ne = 1 on all edges.
Let β = (βe)e∈E be the vector of edge allocations. Since the flow at equilibrium is unique, for any
β, the average delay at equilibrium is unique. L(β) is this unique average delay as a function of the edge
allocations. When considering a flow f other than the equilibrium flow, we use L(f, β) to denote the average
delay of flow f with the modified delay functions. We will also have occasion to allocate budget to units
other than edges, e.g., paths, and will slightly abuse notation to express the average delay in terms of these
units.
Our problem corresponds to the following (non-linear, possibly non-convex) optimization problem:
min
β
L(β), s.t.
∑
e
βe ≤ B, βe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E . (1)
We use β∗ to denote an optimal solution for this problem, and define L∗ := L(β∗). As is common
in nonlinear optimization, instead of an exact solution we will obtain a solution that is within a specified
additive tolerance of ǫ of the exact solution, i.e., a valid allocation βˆ so that L(βˆ)−ǫ ≤ L(β∗). An algorithm
is polynomial-time if it obtains such a solution in time polynomial in the input size and log(1/ǫ). Since the
problem has linear constraints, the first-order conditions are necessary for optimality (e.g., [37]). By the
first-order conditions for optimality, for any edges e and e′,
βe > 0⇒ ∂L(β)
∂βe
≤ ∂L(β)
∂βe′
. (2)
For any edge e and allocation β, define ce(β) = ce + µeβe. For a path p, bp =
∑
e∈p be as the
length of path p. For affine delay functions, define cp(β) = 1/
∑
e∈p
1
ce(β)
as the conductance of path
p, and the resistance of path p as the reciprocal of the conductance: rp(β) = 1/cp(β). For k ∈ Z+,
[k] := {1, 2, . . . , k}. The following statement is easily verified; it is used often in our proofs, hence we state
it formally below for ease of reference.
Fact 2. For x, y, z ∈ R≥0 and k ∈ R>0,
x
y
> k ⇐⇒ x+ kz
y + z
<
x
y
⇐⇒ x− kz
y − z >
x
y
.
4 Tight Bounds in General Graphs
4.1 Simple approximation algorithms for general graphs
We start with a simple polynomial-time algorithm that gives a good approximation for the general network
improvement problem: with multiple sources and sinks, in general graphs, and with polynomial delay func-
tions. The algorithm follows from the observation that relaxing the equilibrium constraints on the flow
yields a convex problem. Although the algorithm described here is a very natural one and lower bounds for
its performance were given in [20], the upper bounds shown here appear not to have been noticed earlier. In
fact, in the next section we will show that the bound obtained by this simple algorithm is tight in the case of
affine delay functions.
Consider the following problem:
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COPT: min
x,β
∑
e
xele(xe, βe) s.t. x is a valid flow, and β is a valid allocation.
It is obvious the constraints for COPT are convex. We now show that if the delay functions le(xe, βe) are
polynomial, then the objective is a convex function as well.
Lemma 3. The objective function for COPT with polynomial delays is convex.
Proof. We will show that the Hessian for each term in the summation in the objective is positive semi-
definite. This will show that each individual term is convex, and hence the objective is convex as well. Each
term in the summation is of the form
l(x, β) :=
xn+1
(c+ µβ)n
+ bx .
We will show that l(x, β) is a convex function for the proof. The following derivatives are easily obtained:
∂l
∂x
=
(n+ 1)xn
(c+ µβ)n
+ b ,
∂2l
∂x2
=
(n+ 1)nxn−1
(c+ µβ)n
(3)
∂l
∂β
= − nµx
n+1
(c+ µβ)n+1
,
∂2l
∂β2
=
(n+ 1)nµ2xn+1
(c+ µβ)n+2
(4)
∂2l
∂β ∂x
=
∂2l
∂x ∂β
= −n(n+ 1)µx
n
(c+ µβ)n+1
(5)
The Hessian for function l(x, β) is given by
H :=
[
∂2l
∂x2
∂2l
∂x∂β
∂2l
∂β∂x
∂2l
∂β2
]
For any vector α = [α1 α2]T we will show that αTHα ≥ 0, which proves the positive semi-definiteness
of H and hence the convexity of l(x, β). By the expressions from (3), (4) and (5),
αTHα = α21
n(n+ 1)xn−1
(c+ µβ)n
+ α22
n(n+ 1)xn+1µ2
(c+ µβ)n+2
− 2α1α2n(n+ 1)µx
n
(c+ µβ)n+1
=
n(n+ 1)xn−1
(c+ µβ)n
(
α21 + α
2
2
x2µ2
(c+ µβ)2
− 2α1α2 xµ
(c+ µβ)
)
=
n(n+ 1)xn−1
(c+ µβ)n
(
α1 − α2 xµ
c+ µβ
)2
≥ 0 .
The solution (xˆ, βˆ) to problem COPT can thus be obtained in polynomial time. Our approximation
algorithm then simply returns the allocation βˆ obtained by solving COPT.
Lemma 4. If the delay function on every edge is affine, then the delay obtained at equilibrium for the
allocation βˆ is a 4/3-approximation to the delay at equilibrium for the optimal allocation β∗. In general if
all delay functions are polynomials of degree at most p, then the delay obtained at equilibrium for βˆ is an
O(p/ log p)-approximation to the delay at equilibrium for the optimal allocation β∗.
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Proof. Let f∗ be the equilibrium flow obtained for the optimal allocation β∗, and let f be the equilibrium
flow for allocation βˆ. It is obvious that
∑
e f
∗
e le(f
∗
e , β
∗
e ) ≥
∑
e xˆele(xˆe, βˆe). For fixed affine delays, it is
well-known that the total delay of the equilibrium routing is at most 4/3 that of the the flow that minimizes
the total delay [28]. Thus, ∑e fele(fe, βˆe) ≤ 4/3∑e xˆele(xˆe, βˆe). The statement of the lemma for affine
delays follows. Further, the statement for general polynomial delays follows since the total delay of the
equilibrium routing is known to be at mostO(p/ log p) that of the the flow that minimizes the total delay [24].
4.2 A nearly tight lower bound for affine delays
We now show that the upper bounds obtained in the previous section are tight for affine delays, even for
single-commodity routing games. We give a reduction from the problem of 2-Directed Disjoint Paths,
which is known to be NP-complete [9]:
Definition 5 (2-Directed Disjoint Paths (2DDP)). Given a directed graph G and vertices s1, s2, t1 and t2,
do there exist si-ti paths pi such that p1 and p2 are vertex-disjoint?
Note that the 2DDP problem is known to be solvable in polynomial-time if the graph is acyclic [30]
or planar [29]. Our reduction is essentially identical to that given by Roughgarden [27] for the problem of
removing edges from a network to improve the total delay at equilibrium in the resulting network.
In our reduction, we allow the budget to be unbounded. We modify the graph for the 2DDP problem
by adding vertices s, t and edges (s, s1), (s, s2), (t1, t) and (t2, t). For all edges except the ones added, we
choose ce = 0, be = 0 and µe = 1. Thus none of these edges cannot be used at equilibrium unless it is given
a strictly positive allocation. For edges (s, s1) and (t2, t), we choose ce = 1, be = 1, and µe = 1. For edges
(s, s2) and (t1, t), we choose ce = 1, be = 0 and µe = 0; thus any allocation to these edges does not affect
the delay function. The demand between s and t is 1.
We now show that if the given instance of 2DDP contains two disjoint paths, then there exists an al-
location that yields two vertex-disjoint s-t paths with delay functions x + 1 on both, and thus an average
delay of 3/2. If two vertex-disjoint paths do not exist, any allocation has average delay at least 2 because
the existence of a common vertex leads to inefficient routing, similar to that in the Braess graph.
G
s t
v
s1
s2
t1
t2
x
1 + β
x
1 + β
x
x
Figure 1: The graph for reduction from 2DDP. Each of the edges in G have ce = be = 0 and µe = 1. Edges
(s, s2) and (t1, t) have µe = 0.
Lemma 6. If G contains two disjoint paths, then there is an allocation for the CNDP instance constructed
with average delay 3/2, otherwise any allocation has average delay at least 2.
Proof. If there exist two disjoint paths, we allocate infinite budgets to exactly the edges on these paths,
thus reducing the delay functions on these edges to zero. We additionally allocate infinite budgets to edges
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(s, s1) and (t2, t). Then the flow that routes 1/2 on the s-s1-t1-t path and 1/2 on the s-s2-t2-t path is an
equilibrium flow of average delay 3/2.
Suppose for a contradiction that there do not exist two disjoint paths but the average delay at equilibrium
for an allocation is less than 2. Let F be the subset of edges which carry strictly positive flow at equilibrium.
Then F must contain an s1-t1 path, as well as an s2-t2 path. To see this, note that F cannot contain an
s-s1-t2-t path, since the delay on this path would be at least 2. However, both (s, s1) and (t2, t) must carry
positive flow. Therefore, there must be an s1-t1 path and an s2-t2 path in F . Since these paths cannot be
vertex-disjoint, let v be the common vertex. Then any s-v path in F must have delay at least 1, and any v-t
path must similarly have delay at least 1. Hence the delay at equilibrium must be at least 2.
5 Single and Parallel Paths
5.1 Single Paths
We first consider the case where G is a simple s-t path. In this case, we show that the delay at equilibrium
L(β) is a convex function. Thus, obtaining the optimal allocation requires minimizing a convex function
subject to linear constraints, which can be done in polynomial time by, e.g., interior-point methods [4].
Lemma 7. If G is an s-t path, then L(β) is convex.
Proof. For an s-t path p, the delay at equilibrium L(β) for an allocation β is L(β) =∑e∈p dce(β)+be. Since
d and be are fixed, minimizing L(β) is equivalent to minimizing
∑
e∈p 1/ce(β), which is a convex function,
since each ce(β) is an affine function.
5.2 Parallel Paths
When G consists of parallel paths between s and t, L(β) may not be a convex function of β, and Figure 2
gives an example of this nonconvexity. The graph shows the delay at equilibrium as the allocation to edge
1 is increased and allocation to edge 2 is decreased, keeping the total allocation equal to the budget B = 3.
We will show that for network improvement, the first-order conditions for optimality are sufficient. Hence,
any solution that satisfies the first-order optimality conditions is a global minimum. We will then use this
characterization to give a continuous greedy-like algorithm that uses the particular structure of the first-order
optimality conditions to obtain an allocation.
10x+ 90 µ1 = 1
5x
µ2 = 0.1
d = 40
(a) The example.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
98
98.5
99
99.5
Eq
ui
lib
riu
m
 d
el
ay
Allocation to edge 1 (remainder allocated to edge 2
(b) Graph showing nonconvexity of equilibrium delay.
Figure 2: Example showing nonconvexity of equilibrium delay. Budget B = 3.
Assume the given graph consists of m s-t paths. As before, P is the set of all s-t paths. We relabel paths
so that b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bm where bi is the length of path i, and for simplicity, we assume that all these
inequalities are strict (the case where some inequalities are not strict requires only minor modifications to the
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algorithm and analysis but requires tedious notation). Here, we assume that the equilibrium flow obtained
for the optimal allocation L(β∗) > bm, and hence by definition of the equilibrium flow all paths must carry
positive flow at equilibrium. Relaxing the assumption requires us to solve the problem multiple times for
increasing subsets of P, and we leave this to the appendix.
By Section 5.1, we know how to maximize the conductance of any path p for a fixed budget. Hence in
the case of parallel paths, we will focus on obtaining an allocation to paths, rather than individual edges on
paths, and assume that once the optimal allocation to paths is known, we can compute the allocation to the
edges. We use βp to denote the (scalar) allocation to path p, β to denote the vector of allocations to paths,
and use cp(βp) to denote the maximum conductance of path p obtained for allocation βp.
We first establish the concavity of path conductance.1
Lemma 8. For any path p, let β′ and β′′ be two vectors of allocations to edges in path p and define
β(λ) := λβ′ + (1− λ)β′′ for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and cp(λ) := cp(β(λ)). Then
1. cp(λ) is concave.
2. If cp(λ) is not strictly concave at some λ ∈ (0, 1), then cp(λ) is linear for all λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We will find it more convenient in the proof to work with resistances rather than conductances, where
rp(λ) = 1/cp(λ) and for each edge e, re(λ) = 1/ce(λ). Then
dcp(λ)
dλ
= − 1
r2p(λ)
drp(λ)
dλ
and differentiating again,
d2cp(λ)
dλ2
= − 1
r4p(λ)
(
r2p(λ)
d2rp(λ)
dλ2
− 2rp(λ)
(
drp(λ)
dλ
)2)
= − 1
r3p(λ)
(
rp(λ)
d2rp(λ)
dλ2
− 2
(
drp(λ)
dλ
)2)
. (6)
We will use Cauchy-Schwarz and the expression for d2rp(λ)/dλ2 to show that the expression on the right
is nonpositive, which will complete the proof of the lemma. For any edge e, ce(λ) is a linear function of λ,
and hence d2ce(λ)/dλ2 = 0. Equation (6) holds for edges as well as paths, and hence
d2re(λ)
dλ2
=
2
re(λ)
(
dre(λ)
dλ
)2
. (7)
To use Cauchy-Schwarz, define
xe :=
d2re(λ)
dλ2
and ye := re(λ) .
Since rp(λ) =
∑
e∈p re(λ),
1Note that 1/cp(β) is a convex function, since each 1/ce(β) is convex. However, this does not imply that cp(β) is concave,
since the reciprocal of a convex function is not necessarily concave, even in the single variable case. For example, both x2 and
1/x2 are convex for x > 0.
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rp(λ)
d2rp(λ)
dλ2
=
(∑
e
ye
)(∑
e
xe
)
≥
(∑
e
√
xeye
)2
= 2
(
drp(λ)
dλ
)2
(8)
where the inequality is by Cauchy-Schwarz and the second equality follows since √xeye =
√
2 dre(λ)/dλ
from (7). Replacing in (6), we get the proof of the first part of the lemma.
For the second part of the proof, assume that cp(λ) is not strictly concave at λ¯, i.e., d2cp(λ¯)/dλ2 = 0.
Then the inequality in (8) must be an equality, which again by Cauchy-Schwarz is possible if and only if the
vectors x and y are parallel, i.e., ye = kxe for all e ∈ E and some constant k. Thus re(λ¯) = kd2re(λ¯)/dλ¯2,
or from (7),
re(λ¯) = k
′ dre(λ¯)
dλ¯
where k′ =
√
2k. Since re(λ) = 1/ce(λ), this is equivalent to
1
ce(λ¯)
= − k
′
c2e(λ¯)
dce(λ¯)
dλ
, or ce(λ¯) = −k′dce(λ¯)
dλ
. (9)
We will show now that the vectors (ce(λ))e∈p and (dce(λ)dλ )e∈p are parallel for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence the
inequality in (8) is always an equality, and d2cp(λ)/dλ2 = 0 for all λ.
For any λ, since ce(λ) is a linear function,
ce(λ) = ce(λ¯) + (λ− λ¯)dce(λ)
dλ
= (λ− λ¯− k′)dce(λ)
dλ
where the second equality follows from (9). Thus the vectors (ce(λ))e∈p and (dce(λ)dλ )e∈p are parallel, and
hence d2cp(λ)/dλ2 = 0 for all λ.
The following corollary immediately follows from the first part of the lemma.
Corollary 9. For any path p and vector β of allocations to the edges of p, cp(β) is concave.
We now obtain an expression for the delay at equilibrium. For an allocation β, let x be the flow at
equilibrium and {xp}p∈P be the unique flow decomposition. Then xp > 0 iff L(β) > bp. Since L(β∗) > bp,
for each path p ∈ P, by definition of equilibria,
L(β) =
xp
cp(β)
+ bp . (10)
Multiplying both sides by cp(β), and summing over all paths yields
L(β) =
d+
∑
p∈P cp(β)bp∑
p∈P cp(β)
. (11)
We now show that if L(β∗) > bm, the first order conditions for optimality are also sufficient.
Lemma 10. Let β′ and β′′ be two valid allocations where β′ satisfies the first-order conditions for optimality,
and define β(λ) := (1 − λ)β′ + λβ′′ and L(λ) = L(β(λ)). Then either L(0) ≤ L(λ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], or
there is a valid allocation β so that L(β) ≤ bm.
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Proof. Our proof proceeds by considering all stationary points in λ ∈ [0, 1]. We will show that if L(λ) > bm
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], then either any stationary point is a minima, or L(λ) is constant in the interval [0, 1]. In the
former case, since there are no maxima, and maxima and minima must alternate, L(0) is the only minima in
[0, 1], and hence in either case, L(0) ≤ L(λ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Let λ′ be a stationary point. Then dL(λ′)/dλ = 0. We first show that d2L(λ′)/dλ2 ≥ 0, and hence
there are no maxima. From (21), and since L is a function of λ rather than β, for any path q ∈ P,
∂L(λ)
∂cq(λ)
=
bq
(∑
p∈P cp(λ)
)
−
(
d+
∑
p∈P cp(λ)bp
)
(∑
p∈P cp(λ)
)2 = 1∑
p∈P cp(λ)
(bq − L(λ)) .
and hence, by the chain rule,
dL(λ)
dλ
=
∑
p∈P
∂L(λ)
∂cp(λ)
dcp(λ)
dλ
=
1∑
p∈P cp(λ)

∑
p∈P
(bp − L(λ)) dcp(λ)
dλ

 . (12)
DefineA(λ) to be the term in parentheses in (12); then dL(λ)
dλ
= A(λ)/
∑
p∈P cp(λ). Note that A(λ) = 0
if and only if dL(λ)
dλ
= 0, and hence A(λ′) = 0. Further, for the second derivative, we get
d2L(λ)
dλ2
=
1(∑
p∈P cp(λ)
)2

∑
p∈P
cp(λ)
dA(λ)
dλ
−A(λ)
∑
p∈P
dcp(λ)
dλ


(13)
and since A(λ′) = 0,
d2L(λ′)
dλ2
=
1∑
p∈P cp(λ′)
dA(λ′)
dλ
. (14)
We will now show that A(λ′) is nondecreasing, and hence any stationary point cannot be a maxima. Each
term in the summation for A(λ) is the product of bp − L(λ) and dcp(λ)/dλ. By assumption, dL(λ
′)
dλ
= 0,
hence bp − L(λ′) is constant and negative. By Corollary 9, the second term is nonincreasing, hence the
product is nondecreasing. Each of the summands is nondecreasing, and hence A(λ′) must be nondecreasing.
Further, if d2L(λ′)/dλ2 = 0, then A(λ′) must be a constant by (14). Since each summand is non-
decreasing, each summand must in fact be constant, and in particular dcp(λ′)/dλ must be constant, i.e.,
cp(λ
′) must be linear. However, in this case, by the second part of Lemma 8, cp(λ) is linear for λ ∈ (0, 1).
Hence the second derivative is zero in (0, 1), which by integration, and since dL(λ′)/dλ = 0, forces the first
derivative to be zero in (0, 1); hence, L(λ) is constant in [0, 1].
An optimal algorithm. We now describe an algorithm for minimizing the delay at equilibrium on parallel
paths. In order to describe our algorithm to optimize L(β), we first show that L(β) is a strictly monotone
function of the budget to be allocated. That is, the value L∗(B) := minβ{L(β) : βp ≥ 0 ∀p and
∑
p βp ≤
B} is a strict monotone function of the budget B. Note that since on every edge e, ce(βe) is strictly
monotone. Hence for every path p, cp(βp) is strictly monotone as well.
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Claim 11. If L∗(B) > bm, then L∗(B) is strictly decreasing in B.
We first show the following claim.
Claim 12. Let β′, β′′ be two vectors of allocations to paths in P so that β′′p ≥ β′p for all p ∈ P and the
inequality strict for some p. Then if L(β′) > bm, then L(β′) > L(β′′).
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that cp(β′′) ≥ cp(β′) for every p ∈ Pi, with the inequality
strict for at least one path. If L(β′′) ≤ bm, the claim is true since L(β′) > bm by assumption. Otherwise,
L(β′′) =
d+
∑
p∈P cp(β
′′
p )bp∑
p∈P cp(β′′p )
=
d+
∑
p∈P cp(β
′
p)bp +
∑
p∈P
(
cp(β
′′
p )− cp(β′p)
)
bp∑
p∈P cp(β′p) +
∑
p∈Pi
(
cp(β′′p )− cp(β′p)
)
< L(β′)
where the inequality follows from Fact 2 and since L(β′) > bi for all i ∈ [m].
Proof of Claim 11. LetB′,B′′ ∈ R>0 withB′′ > B′, and let β′ be the allocation that minimizes L(β) subject
to the total allocation being at most B′. Then consider the allocation β′′ where β′′1 = β′1 + (B′′ −B′), and
β′′i = β
′
i on the other paths. By Claim 12, L(β′′) < L(β′). Since β′′ is a valid allocation for budget B′′,
L∗(B′′) ≤ L(β′′) = L∗(B′), and the claim follows.
We now describe our algorithm. The algorithm proceeds by conducting a binary search for the optimal
value L∗(B). Initially, bm and L(0) are our lower and upper bounds, and L¯ = (bm + L(0))/2.
1. Let β = 0 be the initial allocation.
2. Increase the allocation to paths in P so that for any path p, if βp > 0, then
(L¯− bp)dcp(βp)
dβp
≥ (L¯− bq)dcq(βq)
dβq
(15)
for all paths q ∈ P. Continue allocating in this manner until L(β) = L¯. Note that by Claim 12, L(β)
is strictly decreasing in β, hence any process that monotonically increases allocations to paths will
obtain L¯ as long as L¯ > bm.
3. Let B′ = 1Tβ′, where β′ is the allocation obtained in Step 2. If B′ = B, then β′ is the optimal
allocation for budget B and L∗ = L¯. If B′ > B, then L∗(B) > L¯, and L∗(B) < L¯ otherwise.
Step 2 in the algorithm can be implemented by binary search; we give details on the implementation in
the Appendix. To show that the algorithm works, we now prove the correctness of Step 3. We start with the
following claim about the allocation β′ obtained when Step 2 completes.
Claim 13. Let B′ = 1Tβ′. Then the allocation β′ minimizes L(β) for budget B′, i.e., L(β′) = L∗(B′).
Proof. The solution obtained satisfies
(L¯− bp)
dcp(β
′
p)
dβp
≥ (L¯− bq)
dcq(β
′
q)
dβq
for all p, q ∈ P with β′p > 0. Since L¯ = L(β′), and
∑
p∈P cp(β
′) > 0, this condition is equivalent to
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1∑
p∈Pi cp(β
′)
(
L(β′)− bp
) dcp(β′p)
dβp
≥ 1∑
p∈Pi cp(β
′)
(
L(β′)− bq
) dcq(β′q)
dβq
for all p, q ∈ P with β′p > 0, which are exactly the first order conditions for minimizing L(β). Then by
Lemma 10, β′ must minimize L(β) for budget B′.
It follows from the claim that if B′ = B, then β′ is the optimal allocation for L(β) for budget B. If
B′ > B, note that by Claim 11, L∗(B) is strictly monotone in B, and hence L¯ = L∗(B′) < L∗(B), and
similarly if B′ < B, then L¯ > L∗(B). This proves the correctness of Step 3.
5.3 A simple algorithm for parallel links
We now consider the case where G is a dipole graph, i.e., parallel edges between s and t. In contrast to the
algorithm for the more general parallel paths case in Section 5.2, we show that a very simple algorithm gives
the optimal allocation in this case. We prove that there always exists an optimal solution where the entire
budget is spent on a single edge. The algorithm for obtaining the optimal allocation is then straightforward:
consider each edge in turn, and compute the delay at equilibrium obtained by allocating the entire budget
to that edge. The optimal allocation is to allocate the budget to the edge for which the delay obtained is
minimum.
As before, we assume every edge has flow at equilibrium in every valid allocation. From (10),
L(β) =
d+
∑
e∈E ce(β)be∑
e∈E cp(β)
. (16)
From the first-order conditions of optimality for (1), it follows that for an optimal allocation, (2) must hold.
We show that if two edges e, e′ have positive allocation in an optimal allocation β, then decreasing the
allocation on one edge and increasing it on the other does not affect the delay at equilibrium. For δ ∈ R, let
β′ be the allocation obtained by increasing the allocation to e by δ and decreasing the allocation to e′ by δ.
Lemma 14. If ∂L(β)
∂βe
= ∂L(β)
∂βe′
, then L(β) = L(β′).
We will use the expression for the delay at equilibrium in the following proof, obtained from (16) as
∂L(β)
∂βe
=
∂L(β)
∂ce(β)
∂ce(β)
∂βe
= − µe∑
e′∈E ce′(β)
(L(β)− be) ∀e ∈ E (17)
Proof. Since ∂L(β)
∂βe
= ∂L(β)
∂βe′
, from (17),
µe
be − L(β)∑
r∈E cr(β)
= µe′
be′ − L(β)∑
r∈E cr(β)
,
or, with some algebraic manipulation,
L(β) =
beµe − be′µe′
µe − µe′
. (18)
Since in β′, the allocation to e is increased and the allocation to e′ is decreased by δ,
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L(β′) =
d+
∑
r∈E brcr(β) + beµeδ − be′µe′δ∑
r∈E cr(β) + µeδ − µe′δ
. (19)
From (11) and (18), the numerator above is exactly L(β) times the denominator. Replacing in (19) thus
yields that L(β′) = L(β).
The following corollary is obtained since we can start with any optimal allocation that allocates to more
than a single edge and by Lemma 14 successively shift allocation onto a single edge so that we are left with
an allocation on a single edge that yields the optimal delay at equilibrium.
Corollary 15. There exists an optimal allocation where the entire budget is allocated to a single edge.
Proof. Consider an optimal allocation β∗ of the budget to k > 1 edges and edges e, e′ with strictly positive
allocation. Consider the modified allocation β′: β′r = β∗r for r 6= e, e′; β′e = β∗e + β∗e′ , and β′e′ = 0. Then β′
is a valid allocation, and since βe, βe′ > 0, ∂L(β)∂βe =
∂L(β)
∂βe′
by the first-order conditions for optimality. Then
by the lemma, L(β′) = L(β∗). Thus, β′ is an optimal allocation where exactly k − 1 edges have strictly
positive allocation, and successively removing edges from the optimal allocation in this manner gives us the
corollary.
Thus, the simple algorithm given earlier that allocates the entire budget to a single edge is optimal.
6 NP-Hardness in Series-Dipole Graphs
In contrast to the previous section, we show that even in fairly simple networks called series-dipole networks,
the network improvement problem is NP-hard. A series-dipole graph consists of a number of subgraphs
consisting of parallel edges (called dipole graphs) connected in series. In fact, we show that even when each
dipole consists of just two edges, computing the optimal allocation is NP-hard. We will use n to denote the
number of dipoles in the graph.
The delay at equilibrium in a series-dipole graph is the sum of delays on the individual dipoles. Further,
given an allocation of the budget to dipoles rather than individual edges, by Corollary 15 the optimal allo-
cation to the edges can be determined by independently finding the edge in each dipole that minimizes the
delay on the dipole on being allocated the entire budget for the dipole. Hence in this section we consider
allocations to dipoles rather than individual edges, and define an allocation β = (βi)i∈[n]. Allocation β is
valid if
∑
i βi ≤ B and all βi ≥ 0. Further, define Li(βi) as the optimal delay in dipole i on being allocated
βi. Thus L(β) =
∑
i Li(βi).
We show that the problem of network improvement is NP-hard by a reduction from partition.
Definition 16 (Partition). Given n items where item i has value vi and
∑
i vi = 2V , select a subset S of the
items so that
∑
i∈S vi = V .
For the ith dipole consisting of edges e1 and e2, the values for the parameters in our construction are as
follows. Let δ = 19/31 and λ = 4
√
2− 1. Then
c1 =
δ
vi
, c2 =
1− δ
vi
, µ1 = λv
2
i , µ2 = 2λv
2
i , b1 = (λ+ 2)vi, b2 = 0, demand d = 2(λ+ 2) .
Claim 17. For the instance constructed, there exists an allocation αi = (1 +
√
2)vi for the ith dipole so
that, for any allocation x, Li(x) ≥ Li(αi) + αi − x, with equality if and only if x = αi or x = αi + vi.
15
Proof. Fix a dipole i. Let v = vi and c1, c2, µ1, µ2, b1, b2 and d be the parameters given above. Since each
dipole consists of two parallel edges, by Corollary 15, we only need to consider allocations to a single edge.
Since b2 = 0, if Li(x) ≥ b1 then both edges carry flow at equilibrium, otherwise only edge e2 has positive
flow. Hence, from (11),
L(x) =


min
{
d+ b1 (c1 + (x/µ1))
c1 + c2 + x/µ1
,
d+ b1c1
c1 + c2 + (x/µ2)
}
if L(x) ≥ b1
d
c2 + (x/µ2)
otherwise
Define the following functions:
C1(x) :=
d+ b1 (c1 + (x/µ1))
c1 + c2 + x/µ1
, C2(x) :=
d+ b1c1
c1 + c2 + (x/µ2)
, and C3(x) :=
d
c2 + (x/µ2)
.
By definition, then L(x) = min{C1(x), C2(x), C3(x)}. Define γ = 2v(5
√
2 + 1) and α = v(
√
2 + 1). We
will show the following properties for these functions:
1. C1(x) + x ≥ γ, with equality if and only if x = α.
2. C2(x) + x ≥ γ, with equality if and only if x = α+ v.
3. C3(x) + x > γ.
The proof of the claim then follows from these properties, and from definition of L(x).
Proof of (1). The proof proceeds by showing that C1(x)+x is a strictly convex function for x ≥ 0, and then
showing that the function is minimized at x = α and C1(α) + α = γ. For convenience, we differentiate
C1(x) + x− b1, yielding
d (C1(x) + x− b1)
dx
= − 1
µ1
d− b1c2
(c1 + c2 + x/µ1)
2 + 1
It is obvious that the expression on the right is strictly increasing in x, and hence C1(x) is strictly convex.
Setting the derivative to be zero gives
x =
√
µ1(d− b1c2)− µ1(c1 + c2) .
Replacing values for the parameters,
x =
√
v2λ
(
2(λ+ 2)− v(λ+ 2)1− δ
v
)
− v2λ1
v
= v
(√
2λ(λ+ 2)− λ(λ+ 2)12
31
− λ
)
= v
(√
2× 31− 3112
31
− 4
√
2 + 1
)
= v(
√
2 + 1) = α
where the second and third equalities are obtained by replacing the values for t and λ respectively. We now
evaluate C1(α) + α to obtain
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C1(α) + α =
2(λ+ 2) + v(λ+ 2)
(
δ
v
+ v(1+
√
2)
v2λ
)
1
v
+ v(1+
√
2)
v2λ
+ v(1 +
√
2)
= v
2(λ+ 2) + (λ+ 2)
(
t+ (1+
√
2)
λ
)
1 + 1+
√
2
λ
+ v(1 +
√
2)
= v
2λ(λ+ 2) + δ(λ+ 2)λ+ (λ+ 2)(1 +
√
2)
λ+ 1 +
√
2
+ v(1 +
√
2)
= v
62 + 19 + 9 + 5
√
2
5
√
2
+ v(1 +
√
2)
= v(1 + 9
√
2) + v(1 +
√
2) = v(2 + 10
√
2) = γ .
Thus, C1(x) + x is minimized at x = α, and C1(α) + α = γ. Since C1(x) is strictly convex for x ≥ 0,
C1(x) + x > γ for x 6= γ and x ≥ 0.
Proof of (2). Our proof is very similar to the proof for C1(x). We observe that C2(x) + x is strictly convex
for x ≥ 0. We show that C2(x) + x is minimized at x = α+ v, and that C2(α+ v) + α+ v = γ. By strict
convexity, C2(x) + x > γ for x 6= α+ v and x ≥ 0, completing the proof.
Differentiate C2(x) + x gives us
d (C2(x) + x)
dx
= − 1
µ2
d+ b1c1
(c1 + c2 + x/µ2)
2 + 1
Again, the expression on the right is strictly increasing, and hence C2(x) is strictly convex. Setting the
derivative to be zero gives
x =
√
µ2(d+ b1c1)− µ2(c1 + c2)
=
√
2v2λ
(
2(λ+ 2) + v(λ+ 2)
δ
v
)
− 2v2λ1
v
= v
(√
2λ(λ+ 2)(2 + δ)− 2λ
)
= v
(
9
√
2− 2(4
√
2− 1)
)
= v(
√
2 + 2) = α+ v .
We evaluate C2(α+ v) + α+ v to obtain
C2(α+ v) + α+ v =
2(λ+ 2) + v(λ+ 2) δ
v
1
v
+ α+v
2v2λ
+ α+ v
= v
4λ(λ+ 2) + 2δλ(λ + 2)
2λ+ α+v
v
+ α+ v
= v
124 + 62×1931
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√
2− 2 + 2 +√2 + v(2 +
√
2) = v9
√
2 + v(2 +
√
2) = γ .
This completes the proof for (2).
Proof of (3). We show that the minimum value of C3(x) + x is strictly larger than γ. Differentiating
C3(x) + x,
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d (C3(x) + x)
dx
= − 1
µ2
d
(c2 + x/µ2)
2 + 1
and hence, C3(x) + x is minimized when
x =
√
dµ2 − µ2c2 .
Let x′ denote this value that minimizes C3(x) + x. Then
C3(x) + x ≥ d
c2 + x′/µ2
+ x′
=
√
dµ2 +
√
dµ2 − µ2c2
= 2
√
2(λ+ 2)2v2λ− 2v2λ1− t
v
= 4v
√
31− 2v(4
√
2− 1)12
31
> γ .
We choose our budget B = V +
∑
i αi. Claim 17 is illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts the optimal
delay at equilibrium Li(x) in dipole i as a function of the allocation x to the dipole. By Corollary 15, for
a single dipole it is always optimal to assign the entire budget to a single edge. Further, from (16) and
the first-order conditions for optimality it can be obtained that the budgets for which it is optimal to assign
to a fixed edge form a continuous interval, and the delay at equilibrium as a function of the allocation is
convex in these intervals. This is depicted by the two convex portions of the curve in Figure 3. Our proof
of hardness is based on observing that our construction from Claim 17 puts the entire curve above the line
y = Li(αi) + αi − x except at points x = αi and x = αi + vi where the curve is tangent to the line.
Li(x)
Li(αi)
Li(αi)− vi
αi αi + vi
x
Figure 3: The Li(x) curve for dipole i is tangent to line y = Li(αi) + αi − x at exactly two points, x = αi
and x = αi + vi.
Lemma 18. The optimal delay for the constructed instance and the given budget is ∑i Li(αi) − V if and
only if the given instance of partition has a solution.
Proof. For any allocation {βi}i∈[n], the delay obtained at equilibrium is the sum of the dipoles. Thus
L(β) =
∑
i Li(βi). By Claim 17, L(β) ≥
∑
i(Li(αi) + αi − βi). Since
∑
i βi ≤ B = V +
∑
i αi,
L(β) ≥ ∑i Li(αi) − V . We will show that this lower bound is achieved if and only if the instance of
partition has a solution.
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Suppose the instance has a solution S ⊆ [n]. Then for the network improvement instance, allocate
βi = αi to each dipole i 6∈ S, and βi = αi + vi to each dipole i ∈ S. For this allocation, by the claim,
L(β) =
∑
i∈S
(Li(αi) + αi − αi − vi) +
∑
i 6∈S
(Li(αi) + αi − αi)
=
∑
i∈[n]
Li(αi)−
∑
i∈S
vi =
∑
i∈[n]
Li(αi)− V
completing the proof in this direction. For the other direction, suppose the instance of network improvement
has an allocation β that achieves the lower bound. Then the inequality in Claim 17 must hold with equality
for each dipole. Hence for each dipole, either βi = αi, or βi = αi + vi. Let S be the set of dipoles with the
latter allocation. Then
L(β) =
∑
i 6∈S
Li(αi) +
∑
i∈S
(Li(αi)− vi) =
∑
i
Li(αi)− V
where the first equality is by Claim 17 and the second equality is because the allocation achieves the lower
bound in the lemma. It follows immediately that
∑
i∈S vi = V , and hence S is a solution to the partition
instance.
7 An FPTAS for Series-Parallel Graphs
In the previous section, we have shown that even for limited network topologies, obtaining the optimal
allocation is weakly NP-hard, and thus these topologies are unlikely to have optimal polynomial time al-
gorithms. We now show that for a large class of graphs with a single source and sink, we can obtain in
polynomial time near-optimal algorithms for network improvement. Specifically, we present an FPTAS2
for the network improvement with bounded polynomial delays on a two-terminal series-parallel graph. Our
algorithm is based on appropriately discretizing the space of budgets and flows on each subgraph H of the
graph G. We then obtain the allocation and flow that minimizes the maximum delay over all paths with
positive flow in this discretized space. Although the discretized flow obtained will not be an equilibrium
flow, by Lemma 20, this maximum delay will be an upper bound on the delay of the equilibrium flow for
the allocation obtained. We will show that the delay of the discretized flow is a good approximation to the
optimal delay.
We start with a definition for series-parallel graphs and of the corresponding decomposition tree.
Definition 19 (Series-parallel graph). A single edge e = (s, t) is a series-parallel graph with source s and
sink t. Further, if two graphs G1 and G2 are series-parallel graphs with source and sink s1, t1 and s2,
t2 respectively, then they can be combined to form a new series-parallel graph by either of the following
operations:
1. Series Composition: Merge t1 and s2 to obtain graph G, and let s1 and t2 be the new source and sink
of G;
2. Parallel Composition: Merge s1 and s2 to obtain a new source s, and t1 and t2 to obtain a new sink t
in the resulting graph G.
2A fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) is a sequence of algorithms {Aǫ} so that, for any ǫ > 0, Aǫ runs in
time polynomial in the input and 1/ǫ and outputs a solution that is at most a (1 + ǫ) factor worse than the optimal solution.
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The recursive definition of a series-parallel graph naturally yields a binary tree called the decomposition
tree of the series-parallel graph. The root of the tree corresponds to graph G, and the leaves correspond to the
edges of G. Each internal node corresponds to the subgraph obtained by the series or parallel composition
of the subgraphs corresponding to the children. In the following discussion, a subgraph of series-parallel
graph G is a graph obtained during the recursive construction, and hence corresponds to a node in the
decomposition tree. We use sH and tH to denote the source and sink of subgraph H . We use H1 ∼ H2 to
denote the series composition of H1 and H2, and H1||H2 to denote the parallel composition.
We first show that in a series-parallel network, the equilibrium flow minimizes the maximum delay over
all paths that have positive flow.
Lemma 20. Let f be the equilibrium flow in routing game Γ on series-parallel graph G, and g be any s-t
flow of value d. Then maxp:fp>0 lp(f) ≤ maxp:gp>0 lp(g).
We use the following result about flows in series-parallel graphs. We omit a formal proof, which follows
immediately by induction on the graph.
Lemma 21. Let G be a directed two-terminal series-parallel graph with terminals s and t, and f , g be two
s-t flows satisfying |g| ≥ |f | and |g| > 0. Then there exists an s-t path p such that ∀e ∈ p, ge > 0 and
ge ≥ fe.
Proof of Lemma 20. By Lemma 21, it follows that
max
p:gp>0
lp(g) ≥ min
p
lp(f) .
Since f is an equilibrium flow, all paths carrying positive flow have minimum delay, and the lemma follows.
Given a parameter ǫ > 0, define ν := maxe ne as the maximum exponent of the delay function on any
edge. Let λ := ǫ2/m2 be our unit of discretization, where as before m = |E|. For clarity of presentation,
we assume that 1/λ is integral. For any subgraph H of G and k ∈ Z+, we define the set of discretized
allocations Aǫ(H, k) as the set of all valid allocations of budget kBλ to edges in H , so that the allocation to
each edge is either 0 or an integral multiple of Bλ. We define Fǫ(H, k) as the set of all valid sH -tH flows
on the edges of H of value kdλ, that are additionally either zero or an integral multiple of dλ on every edge.
More formally,
Aǫ(H, k) :=

(βe)e∈E(H) : ∀e ∈ E(H), βe = keBλ for ke ∈ Z+ and
∑
e∈E(H)
βe = kBλ


Fǫ(H, k) :=
{
(fe)e∈E(H) : f is an sH -tH flow of value kdλ and ∀e ∈ E(H), fe = kedλ for ke ∈ Z+
}
As usual, let β∗ be the optimal allocation, and f∗ and L∗ be the equilibrium flow and delay for allocation
β∗. We initially make the assumption that β∗e ≥ λB/ǫ on every edge, and will remove this assumption later.
We first show that optimizing over flows and allocations in the discretized space is sufficient to obtain a
good approximation to the optimal delay.
Lemma 22. There exists flow fˆ ∈ Fǫ(G, 1/λ) and allocation βˆ ∈ Aǫ(G, 1/λ) that satisfy
max
p:fˆp>0
∑
e∈p
le(fˆe, βˆe) ≤ (1 + ǫ)νL∗/(1 − ǫ)ν .
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We first show the following claim. The proof uses the fact that for any flow f on an acyclic graph, a
path-decomposition {fp}p∈P of flow f can be obtained so that at most m paths p ∈ P have strictly positive
flow.
Claim 23. There exists flow fˆ ∈ Fǫ(G, 1/λ) that satisfies fˆe ≤ (1 + ǫ)f∗e for all e ∈ E, and allocation
βˆ ∈ Aǫ(G, 1/λ) that satisfies βˆe ≥ β∗e (1− ǫ).
Proof. We will assume we are given f∗ and β∗ and will construct fˆ and βˆ that satisfy the conditions of
the claim. We start with the allocation βˆ. On each edge, we round β∗e down to the nearest multiple of
λB to obtain βˆe on these edges. On an abitrary edge e1, we allocate βˆe1 = B −
∑
e 6=e1 βˆe. Note that by
assumption, 1/λ is integral. Since the allocation to every other edge is an integral multiple of Bλ, so is the
allocation to edge e1. Allocation βˆ is obviously a valid allocation of budget B, and thus βˆ ∈ Aǫ(G, 1/λ).
Further, since β∗e ≥ Bλ/ǫ on every edge by assumption, ǫβ∗e ≥ λB, and thus on every edge
βˆe ≥ β∗e −Bλ ≥ β∗e − ǫβ∗e = β∗e (1− ǫ) .
Allocation βˆ is thus the required allocation.
To obtain flow fˆ , we start with a flow decomposition {f∗p}p∈P so that at most m paths in P have f∗p > 0.
There is some path p with f∗p ≥ mdλ/ǫ in this decomposition. Call this path q. Then on every path except
q, we round f∗p down to the nearest multiple of dλ to obtain fˆp for that path, and assign the remaining flow
d −∑p 6=q fˆp to path q. Since we assume 1/λ is integral and the flow on every other path is an integral
multiple of dλ, so is the flow on path q. Flow fˆ is then a flow of value v with the flow on every edge
an integer multiple of dλ, and hence fˆ ∈ Fǫ(G, 1/λ). Further, on every edge e 6∈ q, fˆe ≤ f∗e . Since
f∗q ≥ ǫmdλ/ǫ,
fˆq ≤ f∗q +mdλ ≤ f∗q + ǫf∗q = (1 + ǫ)f∗q .
Hence for any edge e ∈ q,
fˆe =
∑
p∈P,p 6=q
fˆp + fˆq ≤
∑
p∈P,p 6=q
f∗p + (1 + ǫ)f
∗
q ≤ (1 + ǫ)f∗e .
Flow fˆ is thus the required flow.
Proof of Lemma 22. We will show the lemma is true for flow fˆ and allocation βˆ obtained in Claim 23. Note
that for any edge e, fˆe > 0 only if f∗e > 0. Then for any path p with fˆe > 0 on every edge e ∈ p,
∑
e∈p
le(fˆe, βˆe) =
∑
e∈p
(
fˆe
ce + µeβˆe
)ne
+ be
≤
∑
e∈p
(
(1 + ǫ)f∗e
ce + (1− ǫ)µeβ∗e
)ne
+ be
≤
(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
)ν (∑
e∈p
f∗e
ce + µeβ∗e
+ be
)
=
(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
)ν
L∗ .
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where the last equality is because f∗e > 0 for every edge e ∈ p.
We utilise the recursive structure of series-parallel graphs to give a dynamic programming algorithm to
obtain an optimal flow and allocation in the discretized spaces Fǫ and Aǫ respectively. For subgraph H and
k, l ∈ [1/λ], define D(H, k, l) recursively as follows.
D(H, k, l) :=


0, if l = 0
le(dlλ,Bkλ), if l > 0 and H = e
minu∈[k]∪{0}{D(H1, u, l) +D(H2, k − u, l)}, if H = H1 ∼ H2.
minu∈[k]∪{0}, v∈[l]∪{0}{max{D(H1, u, v),D(H2, k − u, l − v)}}, if H = H1 ‖ H2.
From the definition, D(H, k, l) corresponds to a division of flow dlλ and budget Blλ between its subgraphs
H1 and H2 so that the assignment to each subgraph is a multiple of dλ for the flow and Bλ for the budget.
Hence, by recursion, D(H, k, l) corresponds to an allocation of flow and budget to each edge of H , so
that the flow on each edge is an integral multiple of dλ and the budget allocated to each edge is a multiple
of Bλ. Further the total budget allocated is kBλ and the value of the flow in H is ldλ. By dynamic
programming on the series-parallel decomposition tree for G, D(G, 1/λ, 1/λ) can then be computed in
time O(m/λ2) = O(m3/ǫ2). For the following lemma, for subgraph H , flow f and allocation β, define
lH(f, β) = max
sH−tH paths p:fp>0
∑
e∈p
le(fe, βe) .
Lemma 24. For any subgraph H and k, l ∈ [1/λ],
D(H, k, l) = min
f∈Fǫ(H,l), β∈Aǫ(H,k)
lH(f, β) .
We omit a formal proof of the lemma, which follows from the recursive definition of D(H, k, l). We
now show that if β∗e ≥ λB/ǫ on every edge, the allocation obtained for D(G, 1/λ, 1/λ) is a near-optimal
allocation.
Theorem 25. Given ǫ′ > 0 and an instance of CNDP in a series-parallel graph so that the optimal alloca-
tion satisfies β∗e ≥ ǫ′B/(6νm2), we can obtain in time O(m3ν2/ǫ′2) a valid allocation βˆ so that the delay
at equilibrium for this allocation is at most (1 + ǫ′)L∗.
Proof. Choose ǫ = ǫ′/(6ν), and let fˆ ∈ Fǫ(G, 1/λ) and βˆ ∈ Aǫ(G, 1/λ) be the flow and allocation
that obtains delay D(G, 1/λ, 1/λ). By the recursive construction given, fˆ and βˆ can be obtained in time
O(m3ν2/ǫ′2). By Lemmas 24 and 22,
D(G, 1/λ, 1/λ) ≤
(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
)ν
L∗ ≤ (1 + 3ǫ)νL∗ = (1 + ǫ
′
2ν
)νL∗ ≤ (1 + ǫ′)L∗ .
Let f be the equilibrium flow with allocation βˆ, and g = fˆ . Then by Lemma 20,
L(f, βˆ) ≤ max
p:gp>0
lp(g) = D(g, 1/λ, 1/λ) ≤ (1 + ǫ′)L∗ .
Given ǫ′ > 0, define α := ǫ′/(6νm2). To remove the assumption that β∗e ≥ αB on every edge, consider
an allocation β˜e := β∗e (1 − α) + αB. Then β˜ is a valid allocation. Let f˜ be the equilibrium flow for
allocation β˜. Then β˜ satisfies the conditions for Theorem 25, and hence L(f, βˆ ≤ (1 + ǫ′)L(f˜ , β˜). Further,
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L(f˜ , β˜) ≤ L(f∗, β˜) ≤ 1
(1− α)ν L(f
∗, β∗) ≤ (1 + ǫ′)L∗
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 20, the second inequality follows from the proof of Lemma 22,
and the third by definition of α and ν. Thus, L(f, βˆ ≤ (1+ǫ′)2L∗ where β∗ is no longer restricted. Choosing
ǫ′ appropriately yields the required approximation ratio.
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Appendix
Proofs from Section 5.2
Removing assumption about all paths being used at equilibrium. Recall we order paths so that b1 ≤
b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bm, where bi is the length of path i and there are m s-t paths, and assume the inequalities are
strict. Define Pi := ∪j≤ipj , i.e., Pi is the set of paths with length at most bi. Thus, P1 ⊂ P2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Pm.
It is easy to see that the equilibrium flow for any allocation has strictly positive flow on exactly the edges in
Pi for some i.
Let Pk be the set of paths with strictly positive flow at equilibrium. By a similar derivation as for (11),
the delay at equilibrium is given by
L(β) =
d+
∑
p∈Pk cp(β)bp∑
p∈Pk cp(β)
. (20)
For an allocation β, since we do not a priori know the set of paths used in the optimal solution, we will
consider all possible sets of paths. To formalize this, for an allocation β, define
Mi(β) :=
d+
∑
p∈Pi cp(β)bp∑
p∈Pi cp(β)
(21)
For allocation β if Pi is the set of paths used in the resulting equilibrium, then by (20), L(β) = Mi(β). We
show that knowing Mi(β) for each i ∈ [m] also allows us to obtain L(β).
Claim 26. For allocation β if bi < Mi(β) ≤ bi+1, then L(β) = Mi(β).
Proof. We will show that if bi < Mi(β) ≤ bi+1 then there is an equilibrium flow f with delay Mi(β). By
the uniqueness of equilibrium flow, the claim must then be true.
For path p ∈ Pi, let fp = (Mi(β)− bp) cp(β), and fp = 0 for p 6∈ Pi. Then
∑
p
fp = Mi(β)
∑
p∈Pi
cp(β)−
∑
p∈Pi
cp(β)bp = d
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where the second equality follows from the definition of Mi(β) in (21). Further, each fp ≥ 0, since Mi(β) ≥
bp for p ∈ Pi. Thus f is a valid flow. To see that f is also an equilibrium flow, note that for any path with
strictly positive flow, the delay is exactly fp/cp(β) + bp = Mi(β), while any path with zero flow has delay
at least bi+1 ≥Mi(β).
For any budget B, define M∗i (B) := minβ{Mi(β) : β ≥ 0, 1Tβ ≤ B}, i.e., M∗i (B) is the minimal
value of Mi(β) over all valid allocations. Then if M∗i (B) > bi, replacing L(β) by Mi(β), bm by bi, and P
by Pi, our algorithm in Section 5.2 returns the allocation beta that minimizes Mi(β).
In order to use this algorithm, we need to know k so that the set of paths used by the equilibrium for the
optimal allocation is exactly Pk, since in this case the minima of L(β) and Mk(β) coincide.
Since we do not know k, we use the following iterative algorithm. Start with i = 1, and obtain the
allocation β′ = minβMi(β). If Mi(β′) ≤ bi+1, we stop; β′ is then the allocation that minimizes L(β), and
k = i. If Mi(β′) > bi+1, we increase i and repeat the process.
To show the correctness of this process, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 27. For i < m and any budget B, if M∗i (B) > bi+1, then M∗i+1(B) > bi+1.
Proof. Let β′ and β′′ be valid allocations that minimize Mi(β) and Mi+1(β) respectively. We will prove
the contrapositive. Then by assumption Mi+1(β′′) ≤ bi+1. Further,
Mi(β
′) ≤Mi(β′′) =
d+
∑
p∈Pi cp(β
′′)bp∑
p∈Pi cp(β
′′)
≤
d+
∑
p∈Pi+1 cp(β
′′)bp∑
p∈Pi+1 cp(β
′′)
= Mi+1(β
′′)
where the first inequality is since β′ minimizes Mi(β) and the second inequality follows from the contra-
positive of Fact 2, by setting k = bi+1 and z = ci+1(β′′).
To see that the process given above obtains an optimal allocation β∗, let Pk be the set of paths used
by equilibrium for the optimal allocation. Suppose our process ends for i < k, then it must have found
an allocation β′ so that Mi(β′) ≤ bi+1. Since the process did not terminate at i − 1,M∗i−1(B) > bi and
hence by Lemma 27 Mi(β′) > bi. Thus bi < Mi(β′) ≤ bi+1, and hence by Claim 26, L(β′) = Mi(β′) ≤
bi+1 < L(β
∗), where the last inequality is because Pk is the set of paths used by equilibrium for the optimal
allocation β∗ and bk ≥ bi+1. This is obviously a contradiction, since L(β∗) is minimal.
Further, the process must stop for i = k, since there exists an allocation β∗ with L(β∗) ≤ bi+1. The
process is hence correct, and will obtain the optimal allocation.
Implementing Step 2 of the algorithm. Given L¯, our problem is to obtain an allocation β that satis-
fies (15) and L(β) = L¯. To obtain such an allocation, we will use a binary search procedure together with a
concave relaxation of the original problem for which the first-order conditions exactly correspond to (15).
Consider the following optimization problem P (B), with variables (βp)p∈P and parametrized by the
budget B:
max
∑
p∈P
(L¯− bp)cp(βp)
subject to (βp)p∈P being a valid allocation for budget B. The first-order conditions for this problem are
exactly (15). Further, for each path cp(βp) is a concave function, and hence the objective is concave. Thus
for a given budget B the problem can be solved to obtain the optimal allocation. We now show that by
increasing the budget B, we can obtain a monotone solution β to P (B).
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Claim 28. Let B′′ > B′, and β′ is an optimal solution to P (B′). Then there is an optimal solution β′′ to
P (B′′) that satisfies β′′p ≥ β′p on all paths p.
Proof. Let α′′p be an optimal solution to P (B′′). If α′′p ≥ β′p on all paths p, we are done. Otherwise, let q be
a path such that α′′q < β′q. Since B′′ > B′, there is a path r such that α′′r > β′r . Then, by Corollary 9,
(L¯− bq)
∂cq(α
′′
q )
∂βq
≥ (L¯− bq)
∂cq(β
′
q)
∂βq
,
(L¯− br)∂cr(α
′′
r )
∂βr
≤ (L¯− br)∂cr(β
′
r)
∂βr
.
Further, by the first-order conditions for optimality, since β′q > 0 and α′′r > 0,
(L¯− bq)
∂cq(β
′
q)
∂βq
≥ (L¯− br)∂cr(β
′
r)
∂βr
,
(L¯− br)∂cr(α
′′
r )
∂βr
≥ (L¯− bq)
∂cq(α
′′
q )
∂βq
.
It immediately follows that all the above inequalities must be equalities, and further, for any path p,
∂cp(β
′
p)
∂βp
=
∂cr(α
′′
p)
∂βp
. (22)
Consider the allocation β′′, constructed as follows. Let β′′ = β′ initially. Then for p = 1, 2, . . . ,m
where m is the number of paths, if α′′p > β′p, β′′p = β′′p +min{α′′p − β′p, B′′ −
∑
q∈[m] β
′′
q }. Then β′′p ≥ β′p
for all paths p. Further, β′′p lies between β′p and α′′p , and hence by concavity of conductance and (22), for all
paths p,
∂cp(β
′′
p )
∂βp
=
∂cp(α
′′
p)
∂βp
.
Also, since
∑
q β
′
q = B
′ and
∑
q max{α′′q , β′q} ≥ B′′, it follows that
∑
q β
′′
q = B
′′
. Thus allocation β′′
satisfies the first-order conditions for optimality of P (B′′), and since P (B′′) is a concave maximization
program, β′′ is also an optimal solution that satisfies the conditions of the claim.
We now use the following binary search procedure. Let Bl = 0 and Bh = mB be the lower and limits
on the budget, and B¯ = (Bl + Bh)/2. Solve P (B¯), and let β¯ be the optimal solution. If L(B¯) < L¯, set
Bl = B¯, B¯ = (Bl + Bh)/2, add constraints β ≥ β¯ to P (B¯) and solve again. Similarly if L(B¯) > L¯, we
set Bh = B¯, B¯ = (Bl +Bh)/2, add constraints β ≤ β¯ to P (B¯) and solve again.
Let β′ and β′′ be the solution to P (B′) and P (B′′) with B′ > B′′. The added bounds on β ensure that
β′ ≥ β′′, and since ∑p β′p = B′ at optimality, for some path p β′p > β′′p . By Claim 12, L(β′) < L(β′′).
Hence the binary search procedure must obtain a budget B¯ and an allocation β¯ so that L(β¯) = L¯. Further,
by Claim 28, β¯ satisfies the KKT conditions for the original problem, and hence satisfies (15) as well.
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